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Do Temporary Contracts Affect TFP? 
Evidence from Spanish Manufacturing Firms
*
 
This paper evaluates the impact of the widespread use of fixed-term contracts in Spain on 
firms’ TFP, via its effect on workers’ effort. We propose a simple analytical framework 
showing that, under plausible conditions, workers’ effort depends positively on their 
perception (for given level of effort) about firms’ willingness to convert fixed-term contracts 
into permanent ones. We test this implication using manufacturing firm level data from 1991 
to 2005 by means of nonparametric tests of stochastic dominance and parametric 
multivariate regression approaches. Our main findings are that high conversion rates 
increase firm’s productivity while high shares of temporary contracts decrease it. Both effects 
are quantitatively relevant. 
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Since the mid-1990s, the Spanish labour market has exhibited two salient
features: (a) a widespread use of temporary (ﬁxed-term) contracts, and (b)
a signiﬁcant labour productivity slowdown. As regards (a), aiming to ﬁght
the high level of unemployment reached in the early 1980s (20%), the Spanish
government introduced in 1984 a “two tier” reform in Employment Protec-
tion Legislation (EPL). This reform allowed for much higher ﬂexibility in the
use of ﬁxed-term contracts while the EPL regulations for permanent (open-
ended) contracts were left unchanged.1 As a result, the share of temporary
jobs in total salaried employment surged from 10% in the mid-1980s to 35.4%
in the mid-1990s. Afterwards, despite several additional labour market re-
forms providing somewhat less stringent EPL for permanent contracts and
more restrictions on the use of temporary contracts, this share has stabilized
around a plateau of 30% -i.e., about twice the European average nowadays -
with around 90% of new hires being still signed under ﬂexible contracts (see
Dolado, Garcia Serrano, and Jimeno, 2002).
Regarding (b), labour productivity experienced a signiﬁcant slowdown
during the 1990s, with the average annual growth rate of GDP per hour
worked falling from 2.9% in 1970-1994 to 0.3% in 1995-2005. During the last
decade, employment and hours worked surged (average annual growth rates
of 3.5% and 3.1%, respectively). Yet, the fall in productivity growth has not
been the outcome of lower capital accumulation in the aftermath of rapid
employment growth since Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth also fell
drastically from 0.6% in 1980-1994 to -0.8% in 1995-2005. This unfavourable
productivity performance in the aftermath of the adoption of new IT tech-
nologies contrasts sharply not only with the US -where productivity sharply
accelerated since the 1990s- but also with the rest of the EU-15, where the
productivity slowdown has been less acute (labour productivity and TFP fell
from 2.7% and 0.7% in 1970-1994 to 1.3% and 0.3% in 1995-2005, respec-
tively) than in Spain.
Given that work practices are fundamental determinants of ﬁrms’ pro-
ductivity (see Schmitz, 2005), our goal is to analyse whether there is a link
between the two above-mentioned features. In particular, we evaluate the
impact of the extended use of temporary contracts on the productivity of
1In contrast with regular open-ended contracts, the 1984 reform meant that temporary
contracts entailed much lower severance payments, could be used for regular activities,
and their termination could not be appealed to labour courts; for details, see Bentolila
and Dolado (1994).
1Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms, measured by their TFP. In order to provide
a causal interpretation to this relationship, we start by proposing a very
simple model in which temporary workers choose the level of job eﬀort that
maximizes their expected utility. The main implication to be drawn is that,
insofar as eﬀort is costly, temporary workers will tend to exert higher ef-
fort the larger is their perception that ﬁrms will proceed to convert their
ﬁxed-term contracts into permanent ones (for given level of eﬀort). When
this probability is low, they will ﬁnd it optimal to exert lower eﬀort until
the contract expires since they cannot inﬂuence ﬁrms’ decision by working
harder. In other words, if ﬁrms are reluctant to oﬀer permanent contracts to
these workers -possibly because of the much higher dismissal costs entailed
by permanent contracts- workers will choose to work less hard, especially if
the labour market is suﬃciently tight, leading in this way to a slowdown of
ﬁrms’ productivity. Regarding labour market tightness conditions, the un-
employment rate in Spain has fallenl from 16% in 1991 to 9% in 2005 (the
period we analyse here), as a result of a drastic cut in real interest rates
following Spain’s access to the Euro-zone. Thus, the probability of ﬁnding
another temporary job at the expiration date of the current contract has
been rising throughout this period.
To test this implication of the model, we use ﬁrm-level data from the Sur-
vey on Business Strategies (Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE)
which provides detailed information on a representative sample of Spanish
manufacturing ﬁrms from 1991 to 2005. Given that our dataset lacks di-
rect information on ﬁrms’ conversion rates, our empirical strategy relies on a
two-stage approach. First, the average conversion rate for each ﬁrm over the
sample period is estimated using a simple procedure based on an approxi-
mation to the dynamic evolution of the stock of permanent workers in each
ﬁrm. Interestingly, the average estimated conversion rate we obtain for our
sample of ﬁrms is 12.7% of temporary contracts, which is in line with the
evidence provided by Amuedo-Dorantes (2000, 2001) and G¨ uell and Petron-
golo (2007) on the size and determinants of aggregate conversion rates in
the Spanish economy. Next, by simply assuming a monotonic increasing re-
lationship between workers’ eﬀort and ﬁrms’ productivity, we evaluate the
impact of these estimated conversion rates on ﬁrms’ TFP (i.e., the Solow
residual). Our main ﬁnding is that, even accounting for reverse causality,
ﬁrms with high conversion rates are signiﬁcantly more productive than those
with low conversion rates (for given shares of temporary contracts), yielding
some favourable support to the main prediction of our model. Additionally,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a large proportion of temporary workers are signiﬁca-
tively less productive than ﬁrms with lower proportions (for given conversion
2rates). In spite of not dealing with this issue here, one plausible interpreta-
tion of the latter eﬀect could be that ﬁrms invest less in training temporary
workers given their high turnover rate, a result which has been found else-
where in the literature (see Alba-Ramirez, 1994; de la Rica, Dolado, and
Llorens, 2008; G¨ uell and Petrongolo, 2007).
Since the literature studying two-tier reforms of EPL has mainly focused
on their eﬀects on employment (see Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Dolado,
Garcia Serrano, and Jimeno, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; G¨ uell,
2003), our main contribution is to extend this analysis to study their impact
of temporay contracts on ﬁrms’ productivity. There is, however, a small re-
lated literature that has dealt with this issue before us, but from a diﬀerent
perspective. For example, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) also ﬁnd a negative
relationship between the share of temporary workers and Italian ﬁrms’ pro-
ductivity growth. This result is interpreted in terms of a transitory increase
in labour demand induced by the higher ﬂexibility of temporary jobs (the
so-called “honeymoon” eﬀect of this type of reforms) whereby, assuming de-
creasing marginal returns to labour, ﬁrms increasingly hire less productive
workers through these contracts. Likewise, using an eﬃciency wage setup,
Sanchez and Toharia (2000) ﬁnd a negative relationship as well for Spanish
manufacturing ﬁrms, using the same database we use here but for a much
shorter period (1991-1994) and without spelling out the mechanism linking
conversion rates and eﬀort. Finally, the closer paper to ours to is Engel-
landt and Riphahn (2005) who ﬁnd that Swiss temporary workers exert a
higher eﬀort than permanent workers, using the willingness to undertake
unpaid overtime work as a proxy for exerting eﬀort. According to our in-
terpretation, the reason for this seemingly contradictory result is that the
Swiss labour market is much more unregulated than the Spanish one. In ef-
fect, given the lower EPL strictness for permanent contracts in Switzerland,
the proportion of temporary workers in this country (12%) is quite below
the Spanish share (30%), leading Swiss temporary workers to expect much
higher conversion rates and therefore to exert higher eﬀort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a simple
model of the determinants of temporary workers’ eﬀort that guides the sub-
sequent empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the dataset and presents de-
scriptive statistics on the share of temporary workers and ﬁrms’ productivity,
together with a preliminary nonparametric analysis of how the distribution of
productivity levels diﬀers among ﬁrms depending on their use of temporary
contracts. Section 4 presents the two-step parametric estimation strategy.
Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes. An
3Appendix contains detailed deﬁnitions of the variables.
2 Analytical framework
The eﬀect of temporary contracts on workers’ eﬀort is a priori ambiguous. It
depends on workers’ perception about the probability that ﬁrms will upgrade
their temporary contracts into permanent ones once the former expire.2 The
basic idea is that temporary workers exert higher eﬀort in order to maximize
the probability of getting a permanent contract. However, since eﬀort is
costly, higher eﬀort will be less proﬁtable when they perceive that ﬁrms (for
given level of eﬀort) have a low propensity to upgrade them. In this section,
we provide a simple analytical framework that incorporates these features in
order to understand the mechanism at play.
Suppose that ﬁrms are characterized by an idiosyncratic parameter θ
which yields information about their willingness to oﬀer permanent contracts
to their temporary workers at the expiration date of their current contracts,
taking workers’ eﬀort (e) as given. For example, θ could be interpreted as
that part of the average conversion rate the ﬁrm has implemented in the
past which depends on labour market regulations (e.g. dismissal costs) or
speciﬁc sector’s features (e.g., seasonal production) which can be thought as
being independent of worker’s eﬀort. We assume that workers know about
θ when they join a ﬁrm. Let p(e,θ) be the ex-ante subjective probability
that a temporary worker assigns to being oﬀered a permanent contract. It
is assumed that p(.,.) is increasing in both determinants, i.e., pe > 0 and
pθ > 0 and concave in eﬀort, i.e., pee < 0. Moreover, an additional (key)
assumption is that the corresponding cross-derivative of p(.,.) with respect
to e and θ satisﬁes peθ > 0. This implies that there is some sort of reciprocity
between ﬁrm and worker regarding eﬀort and contract promotion whereby
the marginal eﬀect of an extra unit of e on pe(.,.) is higher in ﬁrms with a
larger value of θ, and viceversa.
It is assumed that the initial contract oﬀered by a ﬁrm is always a non-
renewable ﬁxed-term contract which only lasts for one period. For simplicity,
this contract pays an exogenous wage, wT, which is normalized to zero. Thus,
it can be interpreted as a pure probationary contract without remuneration..
At its expiration date, ﬁrms can either terminate the contract or promote
the temporary worker to a permanent position (from which they cannot be
2The probability of ﬁnding another temporay job at the end of their current ﬁxed-term
contract would be another important factor aﬀecting the incentive of exerting high eﬀort.
4ﬁred) entailing an exogenous wage wP > 0.3 If dismissed, we assume that
the worker can ﬁnd another temporary job with probability h or become
unemployed with probability (1 − h). If unemployed, again for simplicity,
the ﬂow income in this state is taken to be zero. We denote the asset values
(discounted utilities) of a permanent contract, a sequence of one-period tem-
porary contract in diﬀerent ﬁrms, and of unemployment by VP, VT and U,
respectively. To further simplify the analysis, we assume no discount rate.
In addition, we suppose that the level of eﬀort exerted by permanent workers
in their jobs is constant and that VP is exogenously given. Hence, under risk
neutrality, the asset value of a temporary worker satisﬁes:
VT = −c(e) + {p(e,θ)VP + (1 − p(e,θ))U}, (1)
where c(e) represents the cost of eﬀort, which is assumed to be increasing and
convex, i.e., ce > 0 and cee > 0. Since the asset value of being unemployed
satisﬁes U = [hVT +(1−h)U], in equilibrium we get U = VT. Replacing this
last condition into (1) implies that, when choosing eﬀort, the optimization









From (2), the following result holds:
Proposition 1. Let e∗(θ,VP) be the solution of (2) under the previous set
of assumptions. Then ∂e∗
∂θ > 0 only if peθ(e∗,θ) >
pe(e∗,θ)pθ(e∗,θ)
p(e∗,θ) .












∗,θ) < 0, (4)
where the two remaining terms of the form pe(e∗,θ)ce(e∗,θ) cancel out in (4).
Notice that the second-order condition holds because pee < 0 and cee > 0.







3For simplicity, we abstract here from eﬃciency wage considerations in dual labour
markets as in G¨ uell (2003).
5where, given that the denominator is negative (see (4)), it holds that ∂e∗
∂θ >
0 only if the numerator is also negative, that is, peθ(e∗,θ) >
ce(e∗)pθ(e∗,θ)
c(e∗) > 0.




This proposition simply states that, as long as peθ is positive and suﬃ-
ciently large, the larger the expected conversion rate is, the higher the eﬀort
of a temporary worker will be. By contrast, if peθ is zero or small, the neg-
ative eﬀect of the cost of eﬀort will dominate the positive eﬀect of getting
promoted and therefore workers will exert lower eﬀort.
Next, to relate workers’ eﬀort to ﬁrms’ productivity, let us assume that
each ﬁrm has a constant-returns-to- scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas production




where Y is ﬁnal output, B is an index of Harrod-neutral technical progress, e
is eﬀort (weighted by type of labour), L is aggregate labour, α is the labour
share and X denotes other production inputs (i.e., capital and raw mate-
rials). Hence, we can obtain (with small letter denoting logs. of capital
ones) the logged composite Solow residual at the ﬁrm level as a = b + αe =
y − αl − (1 − α)x, which for the sake of brevity will be labeled as TFP
in the sequel. From Proposition 1, when the suﬃcient condition holds, it









From these considerations, our benchmark reduced-form model of ﬁrms’
productivity in the empirical section will be as follows:
a = a(θ,tw,z), (6)
where a is (logged) TFP at the ﬁrm level, tw is the share of temporary
workers in the ﬁrm and z is a vector of other determinants of TFP, to be
described below in Section 3. Allowing for tw to directly aﬀect TFP requires
some further explanation. Note that if its only role were to help tempo-
rary workers in forming expectations about the chances of being promoted,
then this variable should not appear in equation (3) because all the relevant
information would be summarised by θ. However, one could think of other
reasons why ﬁrms with a large proportion of temporary workers could be less
productive. For example, there is an ample empirical evidence showing that
the share temporary workers may directly aﬀect ﬁrms’ productivity if these
6workers receive less ﬁrm-speciﬁc training due to their high job-turnover rate
(see Alba-Ramirez, 1994; de la Rica, Dolado, and Llorens, 2008; G¨ uell and
Petrongolo, 2007). Thus, to allow for this possibility, we include both θ and
tw as separate determinants of a in (5), such that we expect ∂a
∂tw < 0 and
∂a
∂θ > 0.
3 Data and some preliminary analysis
3.1 Data
We use individual ﬁrm data from the Survey on Business Strategies (En-
cuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE) which is an annual survey on
a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms. The sample period
is 1991-2005. In the base year, ﬁrms were chosen according to a sampling
scheme with weights depending on their size category. All ﬁrms with more
than 200 employees were surveyed and their participation rate in the survey
reached approximately 70% of the overall population of ﬁrms in this cate-
gory. Likewise, ﬁrms with 10 to 200 employees were surveyed according to a
random sampling scheme with a participation rate close to 5%. This selec-
tion scheme was applied to every industry in the manufacturing sector.
Another important feature of the survey is that the initial sample proper-
ties have been maintained in all subsequent years. Newly created ﬁrms have
been added each year with the same sampling criteria as in the base year and
exiting ﬁrms have been recorded in the sample of ﬁrms surveyed each year.
Therefore, due to this entry and exit process, the dataset is an unbalanced
panel of ﬁrms. The number of ﬁrms in our sample is 3,759 and the number
of observations is 22,922. Appendix A explains the criteria we use to select
our sample.
Table 1 shows the share of temporary workers by industry, size and age
category. Small ﬁrms are deﬁned as those ﬁrms with less than 50 employees,
while medium-sized and large ﬁrms are those ﬁrms with more than 50 but
less than 200 employees, and more than 200 employees, respectively. Regard-
ing age, we deﬁne young ﬁrms to be those ﬁrms which have been operating
during less than 5 years since their creation, while mature ﬁrms are those
operating for a longer period.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
7As can be seen, the share of temporary workers exhibits large variability
across industries, age and size categories. Within each industry, small and
medium-sized young ﬁrms have in general a larger share. This is quite rea-
sonable since newer ﬁrms are likely to face a higher probability of failure,
and therefore are bound to make a more widespread use of ﬂexible contracts
for precautionary reasons.
As discussed above, to compute ﬁrms’ productivity, we consider a stan-
dard TFP measure derived from a standard constant returns to scale (CRS)
Cobb-Douglas production function, such that, ﬁrm i’s (logged) TFP level in
period t, ait, is given by
ait = yit − αllit − αmmit − αk (kit + κit), (7)
where y is logged ﬁnal output; l, m, and k are logged labour, materials, and
capital, respectively; κ is logged annual average capacity utilization rate re-
ported by each ﬁrm; and αx (x = {l,m,k}) are input elasticities such that
αl + αm + αk = 1. Final output is measured by the value of produced goods
and services deﬂated with each ﬁrm’s output price index. Labour by both
temporary and permanent employees is measured in hours worked , capital as
ﬁrm’s value of the capital stock deﬂated using the price index of investment
in equipment goods, and materials as the value of intermediate consumption
deﬂated by a ﬁrm’s price index of materials. Further details on these vari-
ables can be found in Appendix A. To measure the input elasticities, αx, we
use ﬁrms’ average cost shares over our sample.4
3.2 Temporary workers and ﬁrms’ TFP: Some prelim-
inary (nonparametric) analysis
In this section, we start by evaluating whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the distribution of productivity across ﬁrms with diﬀerent shares of tem-
porary contracts. To do so, we adopt the nonparametric approach proposed
by Delgado, Fari˜ nas, and Ruano (2002) in their analysis of productivity dif-
ferences between exporting and non-exporting Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms.
Following their approach, the procedure in our slightly diﬀerent setup con-
sists of testing the null hypothesis that the c.d.f.’s of the productivity levels
4The advantage of using cost shares is that it is not necessary to assume perfect com-
petition in the product market (see Hall, 1988). Additionally, this accounting procedure
does not require to deal with the endogeneity of the inputs as in the case where produc-
tion functions are estimated; see Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2005) and the references
therein.
8in ﬁrms with low and high shares of temporary workers are identical against
the alternative of stochastic dominance.
The initial stage in this procedure is to construct a TFP index at the
ﬁrm level that measures the proportional diﬀerence of TFP in ﬁrm i at time
t relative to a given (artiﬁcial) reference ﬁrm in each industry. As Delgado,
Fari˜ nas, and Ruano (2002) show, this index allows one to pool observations
across diﬀerent industries, facilitating comparison of TFP in diﬀerent ﬁrms
on a homogeneous basis. The reference ﬁrm in a given industry j is deﬁned as
the ﬁrm which satisﬁes the following properties over the entire sample period:
(i) its output is equal to the geometric mean of ﬁrms’ output quantities in
industry j; (ii) its input quantities are equal to the geometric means of ﬁrms’
input quantities in industry j; and (iii) its cost shares of inputs are equal
to the arithmetic mean of ﬁrms cost shares in industry j. Hence, if ﬁrm i
belongs to the size group τ and to industry j, its logged TFP index at time
t is given by:

























(xτj − xj), (8)
where x = {l,m,k}; j = 1,2,...,18; τ={small & medium-sized, large}; and,
for a generic variable zit (= yit, αx











t=1 zit1[i ∈ industry j]
where 1[·] is an indicator function.
Note that the selective sampling scheme in our dataset forces us to restrict
the three ﬁrm-size categories discussed above to two broader groups: small
& medium-sized (less than 200 employees), and large ﬁrms (more than 200
employees).5
Figure 1 depicts the empirical c.d.f.’s of the TFP index, ˜ a, deﬁned in (8)
in two groups of ﬁrms:6 those with a proportion of temporary workers above
5The c.d.f for the whole population of ﬁrms with a proportion of temporary workers
below the threshold can be obtained weighting by the probabilities of having less and more
than 200 employees in the group of ﬁrms with low shares. The same procedure is applied
to obtain the c.d.f. for those ﬁrms having high shares.
6Note that in this section we use ﬁrms’ productivity deﬁned in equation (8) instead of
the deﬁnition in equation (7) because we want to control for the diﬀerences in productivity
of ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent industries. In the rest of the paper we will apply a parametric
procedure that allow to control for many relevant variables (including industries) and
therefore we will use the standard TFP measure deﬁned according to (7).
9and below a preset threshold value. This value is chosen to be 10% (ap-
proximately the average level of the proportion of temporary workers in the
EU-15). Admittedly, this value is somewhat arbitrary, but we have exper-
imented with other choices ranging from 8% to 15% obtaining very similar
results.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Inspection of Figure 1 shows that, after controlling for industry and size,
the c.d.f. of the TFP index for ﬁrms with less than 10% of temporary workers
lies to the right of the c.d.f. of the TFP index of ﬁrms with shares above
10%, implying that the former are seemingly more productive than the latter.
The next step is to test formally whether this gap in the c.d.f.’s is statis-
tically signiﬁcant. To do so, we apply the nonparametric test of stochastic
dominance proposed by Delgado, Fari˜ nas, and Ruano (2002) which works as
follows. Let Ft and Gt denote the c.d.f. of the TFP index in period t of ﬁrms
with a proportion of temporary workers below and above the preset thresh-
old, respectively.7 We test for stochastic dominance in each size category,
τ, by conditioning the distributions Ft and Gt on a given size group τ0 with
τ0 = {small & medium-sized, large}.8 We then state that the distribution
Ft(·|τ = τ0) stochastically dominates the distribution Gt(·|τ = τ0) if the null
hypothesis Ha
0 : Ft(·|τ = τ0) = Gt(·|τ = τ0) (two-sided test) is rejected and
Hb
0 : Ft(·|τ = τ0) > Gt(·|τ = τ0) (one-sided test) is not rejected. In each
period, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics for these one- and two-sided
















where n and m denote, respectively, the sample size of ﬁrms with a proportion
of temporary workers below and above the threshold value, N = n+m, and
TN(˜ ai) = Fn(˜ ai) − Gm(˜ ai) with Fn and Gm being the empirical counterparts
of F and G (although the time subindex is omitted to simplify notation, the
7We use the distributions in each period of time because observations have to be in-
dependent and this condition is not satisﬁed if we pool observations of the same ﬁrm in
diﬀerent years.
8Notice that, given that the TFP index removes the diﬀerence in productivity between
ﬁrms’ in diﬀerent industries, we are in fact not only controlling for size but also for industry.
10comparison always takes place in each period). The limiting distributions
of these statistics are known under independence (see Delgado, Fari˜ nas, and
Ruano (2002)).9
For the group of small & medium- sized ﬁrms, Table 2, shows that Ha
0
can be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level after 1992. Further, in all these
years, the hypothesis that the sign of the diﬀerence is favourable to ﬁrms with
lower share of temporary workers (Hb
0) cannot be rejected at any reasonable
signiﬁcance level. In the case of large ﬁrms, Ha
0 can be rejected only in 1995,
1996, 2000, 2001, and 2005. However, it is again not possible to reject the
Hb
0 in these ﬁve years.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
It was shown in Table 1 that young ﬁrms tend to hire a larger proportion
of temporary workers the older ones. Given that the former may be less pro-
ductive that more mature ﬁrms (see Fari˜ nas and Ruano, 2004), a potential
concern is that the documented productivity gaps may just reﬂect diﬀerences
in ﬁrms’ age and not diﬀerences in their fraction of temporary workers. To
check this, Figure 2 displays the same graphs as in Figure 1 but this time
for each age category. In the group of small & medium-sized ﬁrms, the pre-
vious conclusion remains unaltered, i.e., ﬁrms with lower share of temporary
workers are less productive irrespectively of their age. In the case of large
ﬁrms, the results are robust for mature ﬁrms and not so clear cut for young
ﬁrms. This ambiguous ﬁnding may be due to the low proportion of large
ﬁrms with less than ﬁve years in the market in our sample (only 176 out of
5,738 observations ).
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Summing up, the previous evidence yields two preliminary conclusions.
First, the productivity distribution of small & medium-sized ﬁrms with a
proportion of temporary workers below 10% stochastically dominates the
productivity distribution of small and medium sized ﬁrms with a higher pro-
portion of temporary workers. Secondly, despite not such a clear-cut evidence
9Under the assumption that all the observations are independent, the limit-
ing distributions of δN and ηN under H0 are given by limN→∞ P(δN > v) =
−2
P∞
k=1(−1)kexp(−2k2v2) and limN→∞ P(ηN > v) = exp(−2v2), respectively. For more
details, see Darling (1957).
11for large ﬁrms, there are signiﬁcant productivity gaps in favour of ﬁrms with
a low proportion of temporary workers when the ﬁrst null hypothesis is re-
jected.
In spite the rather neat evidence presented above, one should be aware
that this nonparametric test suﬀers at least from two important caveats.
First, it does not control for other factors that may also aﬀect the link be-
tween ﬁrms’ productivity and the proportion of temporary workers; in partic-
ular, it does not disentangle the direct impact of perceived conversion rates
on workers’ eﬀort from other eﬀects stemming from temporary contracts, as
discussed in Section 2. Secondly, it just points out to a relationship between
the two variables without identifying a causality link. After all, it may well
be the case that less productive ﬁrms make a higher use of ﬂexible contracts
rather than the other way around. Thus, given these shortcomings, the next
two sections are devoted to study in more detail whether a causal inter-




To evaluate the impact of the conversion rate on ﬁrms’ productivity we
regress (logged) TFP on this rate and on a set of control variables using
the following pooled regression model at the ﬁrm level
ait = β1ci + β2c
2
i + β3 twit + β4 shcit + γ
0zit + ρ(L) ai,t−1 + vit, (11)
where ait is the (logged) productivity level of ﬁrm i in period t, as deﬁned in
equation (7), vit is an i.i.d. error term, ci is the historical conversion rate at
ﬁrm i (see below for the construction of this variable), twit is the proportion
of temporary workers and shcit is an index skilled human capital at the ﬁrm
(i.e., the proportion of engineers and employees with a college degree). The
vector zit contains an additional set of control variables that includes size,
logged age and its square, a dummy variable for incorporated companies, the
proportion of public and foreign capital, R&D investment by the ﬁrm, year
and industry dummies, dummy variables for ﬁrm’s perception of whether
they face an expansive or recessive market, ﬁrm’ s entry, exit, merger and
12scission dummies.10 Lastly, given that TFP levels are highly persistent over
time we also include some lag polynomial, ρ(L), of the dependent variable.
Detailed deﬁnitions of these variables can be found in Appendix A.
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics of the variables in (11), except for
ci whose measurement will be discussed in the next sub-section. As can be
seen, there is a large slowdown in ﬁrms’ TFP growth rate since the mid-1990s,
including a negative growth rate in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s. This evolution
is somewhat similar to the one discussed in the Introduction for the overall
market economy, although much less dramatic than in other sectors - like
construction, distribution, personal and social services- where TFP growth
has been negative since the early 1990s. The average share of temporary
workers in our sample is about 23%, that is, around ten percentage points
(p.p.) lower than the aggregate share for the whole Spanish economy.
[TABLE 3 ABOVE HERE]
According to the main implication of our model in Section 2, ﬁrms with
higher conversion rates will be more productive because temporary work-
ers in these ﬁrms have a stronger incentive to exert higher eﬀort. However,
there is empirical evidence (see Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn (2008) and
the references therein) showing that strict EPL (e.g., high ﬁring costs or long
advance notice periods) has a depressing impact on productivity. This is so
either because EPL reduces the level of risk that ﬁrms are ready to endure
in experimenting with new technologies or because it reduces workers’ eﬀort
since there is less threat of layoﬀ in response to poor work performance or
absenteeism (see Ichino and Riphan, 2005). As a result, it may be the case
that, if a suﬃciently high probability of conversion is perceived, the worker
may exert lower eﬀort since he/she feels almost sure about receiving a per-
manent contract. To allow for this possibility we use a quadratic function in
ci which we expect to be increasing if the suﬃcient condition on peθ holds
(β1 > 0) and concave (β2 < 0) giving rise to an optimal conversion rate ,
c∗
i (= −c1/2c2), beyond which there is a slack in eﬀort. By contrast, as dis-
cussed earlier, a higher share of temporary workers could lower TFP if ﬁrms
invest less in (speciﬁc) training of these workers given their high turnover
rate (i.e., β3 < 0). Additionally, an index of the quality of human capital is
10These variables take value 1 in all the periods in which the ﬁrm appears in our sample.
The proportion of public capital is used because a small fraction of the ﬁrms in our sample
(2%) are participated by the public sector.
13also included in the set of controls because ﬁrms with higher human capi-
tal are likely to achieve higher productivity (i.e., β4 > 0) (see Wasmer, 1999).
4.2 Estimating conversion rates
Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain direct information on conver-
sion rates at the ﬁrm level However, given that we have a panel of ﬁrms, it
is possible to partially circumvent this problem by estimating an average of
the missing conversion rates through the following simple procedure.
Denoting the number of permanent workers in ﬁrm i at period t by LP,it,
this stock equals the number of permanent workers in the previous period,
LP,i,t−1, minus a fraction b of those workers who quit the ﬁrm, plus a frac-
tion c of the temporary workers in the previous period that are converted
into permanent workers, LT,i,t−1,11 Using an stochastic approximation of this
accumulation equation, we can estimate an approximate conversion rate as
the slope coeﬃcient on LT,i,t−1 in the following regression model:
LP,it = (1 − bi)LP,i,t−1 + ciLT,i,t−1 + α
0xit + εit, (12)
where the vector xit is a set of control variables that includes year, size, and
industry dummies, and εit is an i.i.d. error term . Since some heterogeneity of
conversion rates across ﬁrms is required to evaluate their eﬀect on ﬁrms’ pro-
ductivity, we estimate an industry-size-age speciﬁc coeﬃcient ci by including
interactions between industry-size-age dummies and LT,i,t−1. Likewise, we
also allow for ﬁrm speciﬁc coeﬃcients bi in each industry-size-age cell using
a similar procedure. Notice that a drawback of this procedure is that the
estimated conversion rates are time invariant. However, lack of time varia-
tion would be consistent with our interpretation of this variable as a signal
that new temporary workers perceive about their ﬁrms’ average propensity
to oﬀer them a contract conversion (for given level of eﬀort). It seems rather
plausible that temporary workers, in choosing their optimal level of eﬀort,
learn about this sort of aggregate information when they join the ﬁrms.
Estimating this equation (12) by pooled OLS (without the interaction
terms) yields an average (across ﬁrms) estimate of c equal to 0.127. In other
11As mentioned in section 3.2, we are assuming that all the workers start with a tem-
porary contract and that, when they expire, some of them get promoted to permanent
contracts. This assumption is not restrictive since, as Dolado, Garcia Serrano, and Jimeno
(2002) pointed out, more than 90% of the new hires are temporary workers since the 1984
reform.
14words, on average, 12.7% of the temporary workers get permanent contracts.
The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level (t-ratio= 1.87) and
the ﬁt is quite good (R2 = 0.98). Interestingly, this value of the estimated
conversion rate is quite close to those reported in other available studies
about this topic in Spain, using aggregate information from aggregate labour
surveys (see Alba-Ramirez, 1994; Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000, 2001; G¨ uell and
Petrongolo, 2007).
When we allow for heterogeneity in the coeﬃcients c and b, we can ob-
tain in principle estimates of the conversion rate for each industry-size-age
cell ( 108 values). However, as Table 1 shows, some industry-size-age cells
lack enough number of observations to to yield precise estimates of the coef-
ﬁcients. To solve this problem we redeﬁne the cells in such a way that each
one contains at least 25 observations. This aggregation procedure yields 77
conversion rates distributed among 17 industries which are reported in Table
4 together with the number of observations and the proportion of temporary
workers in each category. Notice that, although the estimation procedure
does not guarantee the conversion rate to lie in the [0,1] interval, it turned
out that almost all estimated values lied inside above range once nonsigniﬁ-
cant estimated coeﬃcients in regression (3.8) were restricted to be zero.12
[TABLE 4 ABOVE HERE]
Figure 3 displays the histogram of the estimated conversion rates once
the highly insigniﬁcant ones are restricted to be zero. Its average is 11.2%,
quite close to the above-mentioned 12.7% without inteaction terms. About
85% of ﬁrms have conversion rates between 0% and 20%, with and only 3%
of ﬁrms exhibit rates above 50%. Industries like “Vehicles and motors” (8),
“Textiles and apparels” (13) and “Paper and printing products” (16) exhibit
the higher conversion rates whilst others like “Food and tobacco” (11) exhibit
very low rates. In sum, our evidence point out that Spanish manufacturing
ﬁrms have been rather reluctant to oﬀer contract conversions. This reluc-
tance is most likely due to the large existing gap between severance payments
associated to unfair dismissals (the most frequent ones) of workers holding
open-ended contracts (45 days’ wages per year of service with a maximum
of 42 months) and to ﬁxed-term contracts (8 days’ wages per year of service).
12The only exception is the estimated conversion rate in the group of young small &
medium sized ﬁrms in the “Other manufactured products” industry. In this case, the
estimate is -0.07 and statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. Like with the highly non-signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients, we set it equal to zero.
15[FIGURE 3 ABOVE HERE]
4.3 Some econometric issues
A ﬁrst issue to raise is that, although regression model (11) could be in prin-
ciple interpreted a panel data model, we cannot account for ﬁrm’s individual
eﬀects in the estimation (say, by means of a within least squares approach)
since the conversion rates only vary at the industry-size-age level and hence
they lack time variation. This shortcoming, however, has the advantage
that, in an econometric sense, the average (over time) conversion rates can
be considered as predetermined variables when estimating equation (11).
Secondly, there is the problem that the estimated conversion rates are
generated regressors in equation (11). This would not aﬀect the consistency
of the estimation procedure but it does aﬀect the estimation of the standard
errors and therefore inference (see Pagan, 1986). To estimate correct stan-
dard errors in equation (11) it is necessary to consider the sampling variation
in the estimation of ci. To address this problem, we apply block bootstrap,
namely, we resample over i but not over t. In each bootstrap iteration, a
diﬀerent conversion rate is estimated, so that the standard errors in (11) ac-
count for the sampling error of equation (12).
5 Empirical results
Table 5 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (11). Below each co-
eﬃcient we present the standard error clustered by ﬁrm (squared brackets)
and the bootstrap standard errors (brackets). In general, they are remark-
ably similar. As a benchmark, column [1] presents the OLS results in a
speciﬁcation with the whole set of controls. The contemporaneous share
of temporary workers is used as a regressor, whereas the other explanatory
variables (except ﬁrm’s age) are treated as predetermined by dating them
at t − 1. After trying with several lag lengths of the dependent variable,
we found that only the ﬁrst two lags were signiﬁcant and that an LM test
for autocorrelated disturbances could not reject the null of no autocorre-
lation (p-value=0.125). The estimated coeﬃcients on the linear a squared
conversion rates are positive and negative, respectively, and statistically sig-
niﬁcant, although the latter only at 10% level. The estimated coeﬃcients
imply that productivity is maximised at c∗ = 0.321 [= 0.059/(2 × 0.092)],
a value which is much higher than the average estimated conversion rate
(12.7 %) and that it is also above the rates for a large majority of ﬁrms
16(around 90%) in our sample. By contrast, the estimated coeﬃcient on the
share of temporary workers turns out to be negative and highly signiﬁcant
leading to a short-run impact on productivity of −0.032 and a long-run one
of −0.13 [= −0.032/(1−0.535− 0.225)], in line with the evidence presented
by Sanchez and Toharia (2000) for the Spanish manufacturing sector during
the early 1990s.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, an endogeneity bias may be present since
ﬁrms’ TFP and workers’ type of contract are likely to be jointly determined.
To avoid reverse causality, in Column [2] we replace the contemporaneous
value of twit by its ﬁrst lag, twit−1. We again tried several lags of this
variable, but only twit−1 turned out to be signiﬁcant. The results are rather
similar to those discussed before, although the short and long run impacts of
the (lagged) share of temporary contracts fall slightly to −0.024 and −0.10,
respectively.
Finally, in Column [3] we go back to the ﬁrst speciﬁcation but this time
instrumenting the contemporaneous value of tw using two lags of this vari-
able and of the proportion of public capital as IVs. All of these variables
turned out to be highly insigniﬁcant when included as additional explana-
tory variables in Column [1] so that, in principle, they qualify as valid IVs.
Moreover, the share of public capital is bound to be correlated with the share
of temporary contracts since, according to Dolado, Garcia Serrano, and Ji-
meno (2002), workers in ﬁrms with a large fraction of public capital have
lower probability of being hired with temporary contracts. This is conﬁrmed
in our dataset where the average proportion of temporary workers in ﬁrms
with positive participation of public capital (about 1.2% in the sample, see
Table 3) is 10% against 23% in fully private ﬁrms. An overidentiﬁcation
J-test of these IVs yields a p-value of 0.65 and a partial R2 in the ﬁrst stage
regression of 0.70, thereby providing favourable support to our choice of IVs.
Whereas the estimated impact of the conversion rate on TFP is identical to
that reported in Column [1] (c∗ = 0.321), the estimated eﬀects of tw lies in
between those reported in the ﬁrst two columns. These ﬁndings therefore
support the main prediction of our model about the detrimental eﬀects of
low conversion rates on ﬁrms’ productivity, via lower workers’ eﬀort, as well
as conﬁrm our preliminary analysis in Section 3.2 on the negative impact of
temporary contracts on ﬁrm’s TFP levels. As mentioned earlier, one plausi-
ble conjecture is that workers with ﬁxed-term contracts receive less speciﬁc
17training by ﬁrms given their very high job turnover rates.
Summing up, if we take the IV estimates in Column [3] to be the more
appropriate ones, the previous results imply that, ceteris paribus, an increase
of ﬁve p.p.in the average conversion rate (i.e., from 12.7% to 17.7%) would
lead to a rise in TFP of about 0.15 and 0.65 p.p. in the short and long
run, respectively. Likewise, a reduction of ﬁve p.p in the average share of
temporary contracts (i.e., from 20.8% to 15.8%) would lead to an increase in
TFP of 0.14 p.p. in the short run and of 0.58 p.p. in the long run. Since,
according to Table 3, the average annual TFP growth rate has been 0.94%
in our sample of manufacturing ﬁrms over the period 1991-2005, the joint
contribution of both eﬀects could be unambiguously large.
6 Conclusions
Since the early 1990s, Spain is the European country with the highest pro-
portion of temporary workers, with more than twice the average proprtion
in the EU-15. At the same time it has suﬀered from a drastic productiv-
ity slowdown since the mid-1990s. In this paper we study the relationship
between these these two features using an unbalanced panel of Spanish man-
ufacturing ﬁrms from 1991 to 2005. To interpret the empirical evidence, we
present a very simple model in which temporary workers choose their level
of eﬀort in order to maximize expected utility. The main implication of this
analysis is that temporary workers provide higher eﬀort when they perceive
a suﬃciently large probability of getting their ﬁxed-term contracts converted
into a permanent ones, for given eﬀort. In this fashion, we assume that tem-
porary workers use some average of the previous conversion rates in their
current ﬁrms as a signal of the probability of getting upgraded. Therefore,
the model implies that, other things equal, workers exert higher eﬀort in
ﬁrms with larger conversion rates. We ﬁnd suppoting evidence about this
prediction. Moreover, using both bivariate nonparametric tests of stochastic
dominance and multivariate regression techniques, we also ﬁnd that, even
after controlling for expected conversion rates, ﬁrms with a high share of
temporary workers are less productive than those with lower shares. Our
empirical ﬁndings imply that if a future EPL reform were to reduce the
share of temporary contracts by ﬁve p.p. as well as increase the conversion
rate by the same amount, ﬁrms’ TPF levels would raise by 0.29 p.p. in the
short run and by 1.23 p.p. in the long run these are large eﬀects since the
average annual TFP growth in our sample of ﬁrms has been 0.94%.
18A limitation of our empirical approach is the lack of direct information
on conversion rates at the ﬁrm level. Thus, by having to estimate these
rates at the industry-size-age level, this key variable in our analysis lacks
time variation which prevents us from controlling for individual ﬁrm eﬀects.
Nonetheless, this procedure is in line with our interpretation of workers ex-
tracting a signal about their future prospects of promotion based upon the
ﬁrms ´ average historical conversion rates.
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21A Appendix: Data and variable deﬁnitions
A.1 Sample selection rules
We follow ﬁve rules for dropping ﬁrms or observations: (i), we exclude those
ﬁrms that change from one industry to another because their TFP in dif-
ferent moments of time is not comparable; (ii) we exclude observations with
negative value added or negative intermediate consumption; (iii) with ratios
of labour cost to sales or material cost to sales larger than unity; (iv) when
the ﬁrm reports an incomplete exercise in a year diﬀerent than the one in
which it leaves the market; and ﬁnally (v) fwhen the ﬁrm does not report
all the information needed to compute productivity or only provides that
information for one year.
A.2 Variable deﬁnitions
• Output: Value of the produced goods and services computed as sales
plus the variation of inventories deﬂated by the ﬁrm’s price index of
output.
• Permanent workers: Full time plus half of part time permanent workers
at December 31st.
• Temporary workers: Workers hired under ﬁxed term contract at De-
cember 31st. When ﬁrms report that the proportion of ﬁxed term
contract varies during the year, this variable is the mean of each quar-
ter.
• Total eﬀective worked hours: Computed as the number of workers times
the average hours per worker. The average hours per worker is com-
puted as the normal hours plus average overtime minus average working
time lost at the workplace.
• Materials: Value of intermediate consumption deﬂated by the ﬁrm’s
price index of materials.
• Capital: Capital at current replacement values is computed recursively
from an initial estimate and the data on current investments in equip-
ment goods (but not buildings or ﬁnancial assets) applying the recursive
formula, Kit = (1 − d)
PIt
PI,t−1Ki,t−1 + Ii,t, where d is an industry-speciﬁc
rate of depreciation and PIt a price index of investment in equipment
goods. Real capital is obtained by deﬂating capital at current replace-
ment values with the price index of investment in equipment goods.
22For more details and descriptive statistics on this variable see Escrib-
ano and Stucchi (2008).
• Investment: Value of current investment in equipment goods.
• Wages: Firm’s hourly wage rate (total labour cost divided by eﬀective
total hours of work) deﬂated by the ﬁrm’s price index of output.
• Capital usage cost: Weighted sum of long term interest rate with banks
and other long term debt plus the industry-speciﬁc depreciation rate
minus the investment inﬂation rate.
• Age: The age of the ﬁrm is the diﬀerence between the current year and
the year of birth declared by the ﬁrm.
• Size: There categories. Firms with more than 200 employees (Large
ﬁrms) and ﬁrms with less than 200 but more that 50 employees (Medium
size ﬁrms) and ﬁrms with less than 50 employees (Small ﬁrms).
• Industry: Firms are classiﬁed in 18 industries. See Table 5.
• R& D investment: Value of current investment in R& D.
• Expansive Market: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the ﬁrm
reports that its market is in expansion.
• Recessive Market: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the ﬁrm
reports that its market is in recession.
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Notes: Firms’ TFP measured using the TFP index, ˜ a, deﬁned in equation (8) therefore
productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries are removed.
24Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Percentage of Temporary Workers by Industry, Size and Age
Small Medium Large
INDUSTRY Mean S.D Obs. Mean S.D Obs. Mean S.D Obs.
Young Firms (Less than ﬁve years old)
1.- Ferric and Non Ferric Metals 45.2 31.6 36 30.3 38.5 9 0.1 0.2 6
2.- Non Metallic Mineral Products 41.0 32.4 108 29.2 28.3 29 10.0 8.4 12
3.- Chemical Products 19.6 25.9 28 7.7 11.5 19 5.7 6.4 37
4.- Metallic Products 38.0 29.7 268 33.1 32.1 33 11.1 13.4 5
5.- Agricultural and Industrial Machinery 29.8 27.9 127 32.1 29.4 22 13.4 12.8 16
6.- Oﬃce Machinery, Data Processing Machinery, etc. 42.8 32.2 8 20.4 25.1 7 18.0 16.6 7
7.- Electrical Material and Electrical Accessories 45.9 31.2 82 30.6 34.0 30 16.6 21.2 42
8.- Vehicles and Motors 33.9 24.3 49 30.4 29.8 33 9.6 14.0 41
9.- Other Transport Material 51.5 28.8 18 34.2 29.0 7 4.4 8.2 8
10.- Meat and Meat Products 47.0 23.2 59 19.5 20.2 11 2.7 3.3 4
11.- Food and Tobacco 47.3 30.2 147 33.0 28.6 36 30.3 30.4 27
12.- Beverages 28.9 32.5 7 2.2 3.1 2 11.8 0.0 1
13.- Textiles and Apparels 43.0 33.6 277 42.0 33.0 23 17.4 19.3 21
14.- Leather products and shoes 62.4 32.3 153 30.0 30.3 4 - - 0
15.- Wood and Furniture 46.2 26.2 271 29.2 26.0 25 39.1 28.3 17
16.- Paper, Paper Products and Printing Products 26.9 25.4 195 23.0 14.7 17 13.5 10.4 17
17.- Plastic Products and Rubber 36.6 31.8 129 35.2 34.1 33 35.6 20.1 15
18.- Other Manufactured Products 42.4 30.6 26 5.5 7.8 5 - - 0
Mature Firms (More than ﬁve years old)
1.- Ferric and Non Ferric Metals 21.5 24.0 156 18.9 19.1 111 9.8 12.9 381
2.- Non Metallic Mineral Products 25.0 23.4 667 14.0 16.7 290 12.9 13.0 529
3.- Chemical Products 12.4 15.6 457 11.2 12.8 249 8.0 7.6 786
4.- Metallic Products 20.9 21.2 1054 22.5 19.9 336 20.1 20.1 405
5.- Agricultural and Industrial Machinery 15.2 18.4 612 13.9 15.5 264 13.4 11.6 483
6.- Oﬃce Machinery, Data Processing Machinery, etc. 12.2 16.3 106 23.2 17.0 69 17.1 13.1 127
7.- Electrical Material and Electrical Accessories 25.2 23.0 532 21.1 20.4 321 15.9 15.4 539
8.- Vehicles and Motors 15.8 18.3 172 21.4 20.4 185 12.8 11.7 596
9.- Other Transport Material 28.2 31.4 98 23.8 24.9 101 10.2 13.4 191
10.- Meat and Meat Products 27.2 22.1 294 14.7 17.0 73 28.3 20.4 197
11.- Food and Tobacco 26.2 25.3 1134 30.8 28.4 315 29.1 27.1 623
12.- Beverages 15.3 16.7 143 13.5 9.8 76 13.9 10.7 245
13.- Textiles and Apparels 21.8 25.5 1124 13.6 18.2 400 12.9 13.6 536
14.- Leather products and shoes 32.2 28.9 464 19.7 21.8 80 11.2 16.8 31
15.- Wood and Furniture 24.8 23.9 1064 25.0 22.2 178 22.1 17.2 234
16.- Paper, Paper Products and Printing Products 12.9 15.9 882 12.8 13.4 287 10.3 9.3 511
17.- Plastic Products and Rubber 18.2 17.3 428 24.3 25.2 238 19.0 15.6 321
18.- Other Manufactured Products 18.4 22.2 318 21.3 19.0 64 21.3 18.1 98
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Notes: Firms’ TFP measured using the TFP index, ˜ a, deﬁned in equation (8) therefore
productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries are removed. Young are those
ﬁrms that have been operating 5 or less than 5 years and mature ﬁrms those that have
operated for a longer period.
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26Table 2: Productivity diﬀerences between ﬁrms with more and less than 10%
of temporary workers
Number of ﬁrms Equality of Diﬀerence favourable
Distributions to ﬁrms with
% of TC in % of TC in TC in [0, 10%]
[0,10%] (10%,100%] Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Small ﬁrms & Medium Sized Firms
1991 273 647 0.061 0.477 - -
1992 346 705 0.058 0.420 - -
1993 357 652 0.087 0.064 0.003 0.996
1994 313 613 0.120 0.006 0.000 1.000
1995 274 577 0.157 0.000 0.011 0.954
1996 305 582 0.122 0.006 0.005 0.991
1997 427 684 0.133 0.000 0.009 0.958
1998 401 611 0.116 0.004 0.002 0.997
1999 433 591 0.153 0.000 0.004 0.994
2000 440 547 0.150 0.000 0.003 0.996
2001 417 504 0.117 0.005 0.002 0.998
2002 436 447 0.144 0.000 0.002 0.998
2003 374 313 0.139 0.003 0.007 0.983
2004 374 307 0.103 0.060 0.007 0.985
2005 545 470 0.093 0.028 0.006 0.985
Large Firms
1991 219 311 0.063 0.709 - -
1992 224 274 0.051 0.914 - -
1993 224 197 0.058 0.888 - -
1994 194 205 0.064 0.839 - -
1995 180 198 0.169 0.011 0.011 0.980
1996 176 174 0.134 0.116 0.033 0.840
1997 180 202 0.097 0.367 - -
1998 175 192 0.088 0.529 - -
1999 176 168 0.088 0.569 - -
2000 201 255 0.148 0.027 0.019 0.935
2001 187 205 0.187 0.005 0.015 0.962
2002 193 178 0.111 0.254 - -
2003 175 139 0.118 0.282 - -
2004 157 154 0.110 0.345 - -
2005 192 209 0.135 0.072 0.009 0.985
Notes: Firms’ TFP measured using the TFP index, ˜ a, deﬁned in equation (8) therefore
productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries are removed.
27Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: TFP Growth of the Spanish manufacturing
sector and variables in equation (11)
Mean S. D.
Average TFP growth in the period 1992-1995 (in percentage) 2.58 -
Average TFP growth in the period 1996-2000 (in percentage) 1.21 -
Average TFP growth in the period 2001-2005 (in percentage) -0.74 -
TFP (in logs) 3.63 0.55
Percentage of temporary workers 22.99 22.85
Percentage of foreign capital 16.87 35.73
Percentage of public capital 1.15 9.59
Percentage of the workers with a college degree 4.05 6.78
R&D Expenditures / Sales (in percentage) 0.69 2.20
Age (in years) 24.11 20.48
Percentage of incorporated companies 64.94 47.72
Percentage of entrants 7.03 25.57
Percentage of exiting ﬁrms 1.32 11.40
Percentage of ﬁrms with scission 0.66 8.09
Percentage of ﬁrms involved in a merger process 1.42 11.85
Percentage of ﬁrms reporting expansive market 29.03 45.39
Percentage of ﬁrms reporting recessive market 20.56 40.42
Notes: “Average TFP growth” refers to the average growth rate of the aggregate level of productivity
obtained by weighting the productivity of each ﬁrm by its market share.
28Table 4: Estimated conversion rates
Industry Group Num. Temporary Conversion
of Obs. Workers (%) Rate
Mean (S.D.) Coeﬀ. (S.D.)
1.- Ferric and Non Ferric Metals Small & Medium (Young) 45 42.23(33.19) 0.706 (0.228)***
Small & Medium (Old) 267 20.41 (22.11) 0.098 (0.048)**
Large (Young & Old) 387 9.65 (12.81) 0.163 (0.293)
2.- Non Metallic Mineral Products Small (Young) 108 40.96 (32.44) 0.168 (0.080)**
Small (Old) 667 24.97 (23.39) 0.053 (0.019)***
Medium (Young) 29 29.23 (28.27) 0.980 (0.259)***
Medium (Old) 290 14.03 (16.71) -0.066 (0.081)
Large (Young & Old) 541 12.88 (12.91) 0.121 (0.060)**
3.- Chemical Products Small (Young) 28 19.55 (25.94) 0.135 (0.018)***
Small (Old) 457 12.45 (15.56) 0.125 (0.057)**
Medium (Young & Old) 269 10.95 (12.76) 0.001 (0.116)
Large (Young) 37 5.68 (6.40) -0.009 (0.247)
Large (Old) 786 7.97 (7.65) 0.327 (0.080)***
4.- Metallic Products Small (Young) 268 37.98 (29.65) 0.142 (0.049)***
Small (Old) 1,054 20.86 (21.18) 0.109 (0.037)***
Medium (Young) 33 33.10 (32.07) 0.065 (0.037)*
Medium (Old) 336 22.54 (19.87) 0.103 (0.059)*
Large (Young & Old) 410 19.99 (20.00) 0.140 (0.031)***
5.- Agricultural and Industrial Small & Medium (Young) 149 30.12 (28.02) 0.09 (0.051)*
Machinery Small & Medium (Old) 876 14.77 (17.59) 0.131 (0.046)***
Large 499 13.40 (11.66) 0.155 (0.029)***
6.- Oﬃce Machinery, Data Small & Medium (Young) 15 32.37 (30.39) 0.284 (0.174)
Processing Machinery, etc. Small & Medium (Old) 175 16.54 (17.39) 0.115 (0.144)
Large (Young & Old) 134 17.11 (13.20) 0.298 (0.235)
7.- Electrical Material and Small (Young) 82 45.93 (31.16) 0.196 (0.101)*
Electrical Accessories Small (Old) 532 25.15 (22.97) 0.046 (0.116)
Medium (Young) 30 30.55 (33.99) 0.027 (0.269)
Medium (Old) 321 21.07 (20.37) -0.061 (0.070)
Large (Young) 42 16.63 (21.23) 0.263 (0.026)***
Large (Old) 539 15.87 (15.44) 0.011 (0.038)
8.- Vehicles and Motors Small (Young) 49 33.85 (24.27) 0.216 (0.066)***
Small (Old) 172 15.78 (18.34) 0.144 (0.120)
Medium (Young) 33 30.40 (29.84) 0.114 (0.289)
Medium (Old) 185 21.37 (20.37) 0.142 (0.066)**
Large (Young) 41 9.63 (14.00) 0.652 (0.065)***
Large (Old) 596 12.76 (11.72) 0.202 (0.142)
9.- Other Transport Material Small & Medium (Young) 25 46.66 (29.30) -0.159 (0.119)
Small & Medium (Old) 199 25.96 (28.28) 0.03 (0.030)
Large (Young & Old) 199 9.97 (13.28) 0.113 (0.086)
29Table 4: Estimated conversion rates (cont.)
Industry Group Num. Temporary Conversion
of Obs. Workers (%) Rate
Mean (S.D.) Coeﬀ. (S.D.)
10.- Meat and Meat Products Small (Young) 59 47.03 (23.16) 0.082 (0.078)
Small (Old) 294 27.22 (22.11) 0.077 (0.030)**
Medium (Young & Old) 84 15.34 (17.43) -0.041 (0.087)
Large (Young & Old) 201 27.76 (20.50) 0.11 (0.045)**
11.- Food and Tobacco Small (Young) 147 47.30 (30.15) 0.03 (0.080)
Small (Old) 1,134 26.24 (25.25) 0.031 (0.031)
Medium (Young) 36 33.10 (28.58) -0.061 (0.058)
Medium (Old) 315 30.79 (28.38) 0.001 (0.021)
Large (Young) 27 30.27 (30.42) -0.054 (0.113)
Large (Old) 623 29.09 (27.09) 0.069 (0.027)**
12.- Beverages Small (Young & Old) 151 15.80 (17.74) 0.054 (0.111)
Medium (Young & Old) 78 13.22 (9.88) 0.334 (0.118)***
Large (Old) (a) 246 13.85 (10.68) 0.673 (0.446)
13.- Textiles and Apparels Small (Young) 277 42.95 (33.56) 0.087 (0.044)**
Small (Old) 1,124 21.79 (25.50) -0.08 (0.070)
Medium (Young) 23 41.98 (33.01) 0.237 (0.165)
Medium (Old) 400 13.56 (18.19) 0.096 (0.090)
Large (Young) 21 17.39 (19.33) 0.875 (0.618)
Large (Old) 536 12.90 (13.65) 0.145 (0.026)***
14.- Leather products and shoes Small & Medium (Young) 157 61.60 (32.59) 0.119 (0.063)*
Small & Medium (Old) 544 30.38 (28.32) 0.12 (0.036)***
Large (Old) (a) 31 11.20 (16.78) 0.054 (0.414)
15.- Wood and Furniture Small (Young) 271 46.17 (26.19) 0.135 (0.061)**
Small (Old) 1,064 24.76 (23.92) 0.097 (0.025)***
Medium (Young) 25 29.19 (26.04) 0.329 (0.087)***
Medium (Old) 178 25.05 (22.25) 0.125 (0.042)***
Large (Young & Old) 251 23.26 (18.60) 0.275 (0.087)***
16.- Paper, Paper Products and Small & Medium (Young) 212 26.61 (24.68) 0.267 (0.068)***
Printing Products Small & Medium (Old) 1,169 12.85 (15.29) 0.146 (0.049)***
Large (Young & Old) 528 10.43 (9.31) 0.566 (0.134)***
17.- Plastic Products and Rubber Small (Young) 129 36.58 (31.83) 0.038 (0.082)
Small (Old) 428 18.20 (17.34) 0.196 (0.040)***
Medium (Young) 33 35.16 (34.11) -0.037 (0.246)
Medium (Old) 238 24.25 (25.23) -0.002 (0.030)
Large (Young & Old) 336 19.69 (16.14) 0.14 (0.034)***
18.- Other Manufactured Products Small & Medium (Young) 31 36.45 (31.28) -0.071 (0.027)***
Small & Medium (Old) 382 18.85 (21.66) 0.124 (0.042)***
Large (Old) (a) 98 21.32 (18.05) 0.237 (0.131)*
Notes: (a) No young ﬁrms.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗: 10%, ∗∗: 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
30Table 5: The determinants of ﬁrms’ TFP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Conversion Rate 0.059 0.06 0.059
[0.029]** [0.029]** [0.029]**
(0.037)* (0.037)* ( 0.037)*
Conversion Rate Squared -0.092 -0.095 -0.092
[0.050]* [0.050]* [0.050]*
(0.059) (0.058) ( 0.058)
Proportion of Temporary Workers in t -0.032 - -0.028
[0.008]*** [0.009]***
(0.007)*** (0.009)***
Proportion of Temporary Workers in t-1 - -0.024
[0.008]***
(0.008)***
Human Capital in t-1 0.100 0.101 0.101
[0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]***
(0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)***
R&D Expenditures in t-1 (in logs) 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Incorporated company in t-1 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Proportion of Foreign Capital in t-1 0.014 0.014 0.014
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Age in logs -0.027 -0.026 -0.026
[0.014]* [0.014]* [0.014]*
(0.014)* (0.014)* (0.014 )*
Age Squared (Square of logs) 0.004 0.004 0.004
[0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]*
(0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)*
Expansion 0.004 0.004 0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Recession -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
TFP t-1 (in logs) 0.535 0.535 0.535
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]***
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
TFP t-2 (in logs) 0.225 0.225 0.225
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]***
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
N Obs. 13139 13139 13138
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94




Notes: (i) Dependent Variable: TFP, ait, deﬁned in eq. (7). (ii) All equations include a constant term and
industry, size, year, entry, exit, merger and scission dummies. They also include dummies for expansive
and recessive markets. (iii) Cluster by ﬁrm standard errors in squared brackets. (iv) Bootstrap standard
errors in brackets, 1000 replications. To consider the sampling error of equation (12) in the estimation of
the conversion rate, the bootstrap procedure is applied to equations (12) and (11). (iv) (a) Endogenous
variable: Proportion of Temporary Workers. Additional instruments: Proportion of temporary workers
in t-1 and t-2 and Proportion of Public Capital in t-1 and t-2. (v) Signiﬁcance levels: (b):12%, ∗: 10%,
∗∗: 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
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